US–Iran Standoff

 

Regime Change, Containment, or Something Else? Reading the US–Iran Standoff

What history's two most-cited playbooks, Chile and Cuba, can and can't tell us about where the conflict with Iran is heading.

When a war drags on, people reach for history. Since the US-Israeli strikes on Iran began on 28 February 2026, two comparisons keep coming up: Chile in the 1970s and Cuba since 1960. Each represents a different way a powerful country can try to change or contain a government it opposes. Are we watching one of them play out again?

Two playbooks

The Chile model was about changing a government from within. After Salvador Allende was elected in 1970, Washington squeezed Chile's economy, reportedly with the instruction to "make the economy scream", and backed opponents of Allende at home. In 1973 Chile's own military overthrew him, and General Augusto Pinochet ruled for 17 years. The key ingredient was an internal force willing to act.

The Cuba model was about containment. The US embargo has restricted trade and finance for over six decades. Its critics point out that it never produced the political change it aimed for, and that Cuba adapted by finding other trading partners. Its defenders argue the pressure has constrained the government's options.

What the Iran case looks like

Iran doesn't fit neatly into either. Analysts describe a mix:

• Economic pressure. The US has imposed a blockade and sanctions, which one analyst describes as closer to economic containment than a classic blockade.
• Military force. Unlike Chile or Cuba, this conflict involves direct strikes, including the killing of senior Iranian leaders.
• Mixed goals. Some US and Israeli leaders have openly talked about regime change. Israel's foreign minister has said the aim is removing the long-term threat Iran poses, with regime change possibly a consequence rather than the goal.

Outside powers also want different things. One Foreign Policy analysis argues that Gulf states lean toward a Cuba-style quarantine, leaving Iran diminished but intact, while Israel appears willing to accept a more fractured Iran. The same piece describes Washington as swinging between maximalist rhetoric and tactical silence.

Why the comparisons only go so far

Chile needed an insider. The 1973 coup worked because Chile's armed forces were willing to move. Analysts note that Iran's state still holds a near-monopoly on force, and there is no territory held by an opposition comparable to rebel-held areas in Syria or Libya. Foreign-policy veteran Richard Haass has argued that regime change usually comes either through military defeat and occupation or through internal collapse, and that Iran currently fits neither.

Cuba was a smaller, more isolated case. One 2014 argument noted that the Cuban embargo was largely a US-only effort, while Iran's sanctions have had wider international backing. Iran is also far larger, oil-rich and ethnically diverse, and sits beside the world's most important oil shipping lane.

There is also a third possible outcome that neither precedent covers: a hardened, more dangerous garrison state, like North Korea. Analysts say which path Iran takes will depend heavily on whether its own leadership stays cohesive.

Two ways of reading US intentions

There are two broad readings, and it's worth knowing which one you're hearing.

• The security reading: The US and Israel say they are acting to stop Iran's missile and nuclear programmes and its support for armed groups in the region. On this view the Chile and Cuba comparisons are misleading, because the goal is capability, not government change.
• The pattern reading: Critics, and many commentators in Iran, see a long line from Iran in 1953 through Chile and Cuba to today, in which stated security concerns cover an aim of changing governments. This is an interpretation, and some of the sources pushing it are openly advocacy outlets.

The historical record on Chile and Iran in 1953 is well documented. Whether it predicts the present is exactly what people disagree about.

Where things stand

As of early November 2026, the focus is the Strait of Hormuz. The US and Iran have discussed a phased deal to reopen the strait in exchange for easing the US blockade, and Qatar has been mediating. Iran has set out a list of conditions, and on 3 to 4 November the US struck an Iranian anti-aircraft site near the strait while talks continued. President Trump has repeatedly suggested the US could attack Iran after the 3 November midterm elections. This situation is changing fast, so check current news.

The takeaway

Historical analogies are useful for asking questions, not for predicting answers. The Chile model asks: is there an internal force that could change the government? The Cuba model asks: can pressure alone change behaviour over time? The Iran case so far suggests neither alone is enough, and that the outcome may hinge on things outside Washington's control, especially Iran's internal unity and what regional players decide to tolerate.

Researched by AI, reviewed by :@LiB-AI