Broadcasting When Its Main HQ Is Hit

 

How Iran’s State Broadcaster IRIB Keeps Broadcasting When Its Main HQ Is Hit

In the middle of a live news broadcast on June 16, 2025, the unthinkable happened. Anchor Sahar Emami was on air for IRIB’s News Network when a massive explosion rocked the studio. Dust and debris filled the screen, the anchor fled her desk, and the feed went dark. Millions of Iranians watching state television suddenly saw their regular programming interrupted by the chaos of war.

This wasn’t a technical glitch. It was an Israeli airstrike directly hitting the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters in Tehran.

Yet, within minutes, Iranian state television was back on air.

The same scene repeated in March 2026 when fresh US-Israeli strikes targeted the complex again. Explosions lit up the night sky, parts of the building were damaged or destroyed, and brief blackouts occurred — but the signal always returned.

So how does IRIB continue broadcasting when its main station is literally under fire? Here’s exactly how the system works.

1. Pre-Planned Backup Studios in Tehran

IRIB does not rely on a single central building. The organization maintains a cluster of studios and technical facilities across northern Tehran. When the main headquarters (the famous “Glass Building” complex on Alvand Street) is hit:

  • Signals are instantly rerouted to alternative studios near the Jame Jam neighborhood.
  • A dedicated backup studio in the Channel 4 building (also part of the broader IRIB campus) takes over.
  • News Network presenters have continued broadcasting from these secondary sites even as smoke rises from the main complex.

This setup allowed live programming to resume in minutes during both the June 2025 and March 2026 attacks. IRIB officials repeatedly stated that “broadcasting continues without interruption” while technical teams assessed damage.

2. Satellite Distribution — The Real Backbone

Most Iranians receive IRIB channels via satellite dishes, not ground-based transmitters. This is a critical advantage:

  • Even if studios or ground towers are damaged, the satellite uplink can be switched to backup facilities quickly.
  • The signal is beamed from orbiting satellites that are extremely difficult to destroy.
  • This is why, despite repeated physical strikes on the Tehran HQ, nationwide TV coverage rarely collapses for more than a few minutes.

However, this system has one major weakness: satellite hijacking. In both 2025 and 2026, hackers (widely believed to be linked to Israel or opposition groups) briefly seized IRIB satellite feeds to broadcast opposition messages, protest footage, or foreign leaders’ speeches. These cyber intrusions caused more disruption than the physical strikes in some cases.

3. Rapid Technical Recovery and Redundancy

IRIB’s internal statements after every attack follow the same pattern:

  • “No disruption to overall television transmission.”
  • “Technical teams are assessing damage.”
  • Programming switches to pre-recorded content or simpler live feeds from backup locations while repairs happen.

The broadcaster also benefits from Iran’s heavily centralized media control. All major channels are state-run, so coordination between studios is fast and unquestioned. Power generators and emergency protocols keep the system alive even during wider blackouts caused by the conflict.

4. What It Doesn’t Have (Unlike Ukraine)

Unlike Ukraine’s war-time broadcasting — which uses mobile truck transmitters, decentralized regional towers, and rapid field repairs — Iran’s system remains highly concentrated in Tehran. There is little evidence of widespread mobile broadcasting units or deeply distributed regional backups. Resilience comes from internal redundancy within the capital, not from spreading the system across the country.

Why This Matters

For the Iranian regime, keeping IRIB on air is not just about delivering news — it’s about maintaining narrative control during wartime. The broadcaster is the regime’s voice, and any prolonged silence would signal weakness.

The 2025–2026 strikes showed both the system’s strength and its limits. Physical attacks cause dramatic on-air moments and temporary chaos, but the combination of backup studios and satellite distribution has so far prevented a total blackout. The real battle, however, has increasingly moved into cyberspace, where satellite hijacks and hacks have proven harder to stop than bombs.

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